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Since the historic decision, Everson v.
Board of Educ. of Ewing Township,1 interpreters of the religion clauses of the first
amendment, according to Professor Wilber
Katz, have predominantly fallen into three
schools of thought. At one extreme stand
the "strict separationists," who see in the
establishment clause an absolute prohibition against any governmental involvement
with religion, even on a cooperative basis.
At the opposite pole are theorists who find
in the establishment clause only a prohibition against government's recognition of a
particular church or sect as an established
religion.
Professor Katz's book (the 1963 Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern University)
is among the growing volume of literature
espousing the middle ground of "religious
neutrality." Using Mr. Justice Black's "no
aid" principle in Everson2 as a starting
point, he proposes a two-fold basis at the
root of this neutrality. The first part of his
central thesis is simple: government is required to be neutral between sects and between believers and non-believers. The
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second part is more distinctive: if legislation admittedly within the power of government would have the effect of limiting
religious freedom, then government may,
in its discretion, grant exemptions from
such legislation based on religious grounds
or make special provisions to safeguard
this freedom.
Before examining the implications of
this thesis, it might be well to list in a
general way some of the other expressions
of the neutrality principle. The earliest
statement of such a principle is the Black
dictum in Everson:
The "establishment of religion" clause of
the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. 3
And later in the opinion:
[The First] Amendment requires the state
to be a neutral in its relations with groups
of religious believers and non-believers; it
does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used
so as to handicap religions than it is to favor
4
them.
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at 18.
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Professor Philip Kurland has also formulated a test embodying the neutrality principle:
The freedom and separation clauses should
be read as stating a single precept: that
government cannot utilize religion as a
standard for action or inaction because
these clauses, read together as they should
be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose
a burden.5,
The latest neutrality principle, to be used
for testing the constitutionality of legislation according to the establishment clause,
was stated by the Supreme Court in School
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp:
[W]hat are the purpose and the primary
effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then
the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand
the strictures of the Establishment Clause
there must be a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect 6that neither advances
nor inhibits religion.
The bulk of Professor Katz's concise
book is devoted to an examination of certain controversial areas of government-religion relations in the light of these various
neutrality principles. One significant issue
is exemptions from general legislation
granted to institutions or individuals because of their religious beliefs. Katz believes such exemptions are a necessary implication of the two religion clauses. A
rigid devotion to the establishment clause
might well lead to situations where religious freedom is limited, thus infringing
rights guaranteed by the free exercise
clause. On this basis he justifies religious

exemptions from Sunday closing laws and
from compulsory military service. In Katz's
view these exemptions "are not efforts to
promote or establish religion, but merely
to maintain neutrality-to see that the action of the government does not operate
with hostility to religion." 7 He argues further that legislatures are entitled to discretion in selecting measures reasonably
calculated to achieve their ends. They
need not grant the broadest possible exemptions nor enact exemptions which
create enormous administrative problems.
State neutrality toward religion also
calls for accommodations and even affirmative provisions by government toward
other religious features of American life.
Thus, Katz reasons that government may
provide chaplains both for the armed
forces and for prisons in order to safeguard the religious freedom of those thus
restricted by governmental action. He defends federal grants and loans to hospitals
conducted by religious groups and other
private agencies as safeguards against governmental monopoly of an activity traditionally private and religious in nature.
Many of the author's comments about
religion in public education have been confirmed by the Supreme Court in the
Schempp decision. He agrees with the
Court's opinion in Engel v. Vitale" that the
use of the Regents' prayer might have the
effect of officially establishing a generalized Judaeo-Christian tradition. But he
cautions against a "pedantic absolutism"
in applying the neutrality principle to (1)
public school ceremonies and songs which
sometimes strike religious notes; (2) occasional personal expressions of religious
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belief by teachers or students as individuals; and (3) rules excusing adherents of
particular faiths from school attendance
on designated religious holidays. He believes that not all minor religious observances in public schools need be resisted,
but only those which clearly have the
shape of an entering wedge. He is sympathetic to released-time programs for religious instruction, but only if it could be
assumed that programs where students are
unconditionally dismissed would be no less
successful. He considers the case of
Zorach v. Clauson9 "clearly wrong in having refused to permit the plaintiffs to prove
'
the coercive operation of the program."'
On the issue of governmental aid to private schools, Katz's position is consistent
with his general thesis. "Religious schools
may not be singled out for preferential aid,
but they need not be excluded from a program of general aid, notwithstanding the
fact that their inclusion results in indirect
aid to religious teaching and practice."'
The problem for him is not one of constitutional law, but one of legislative policy:
"Shall we continue to discourage parochial
schools?"' Their divisive effect is his chief
concern. He sees hop, for a reduction of
this effect in "shared time" programs and,
on a more profound level, in the Vatican
Council's reconsideration of the traditional
Catholic attitude toward religious liberty.
The chief value of Katz's book lies in
his discussion of religious exemptions. His
advocacy of these exemptions will not find
wide acceptance,
particularly among
lawyers committed to a strict separation
view. The issue seems to reduce itself to
5343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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one's interpretation of the purpose of the
religion clauses. If the purpose be rigid
separation of church and state, then these
exemptions are indefensible. The Kurland
approach, which demands a primary secular purpose in all legislation, leads to the
same conclusion. But if, as Katz argues,
the religion clauses are intended to promote religious freedom, then affirmative
legislation furthering this goal is justified.
The problem then becomes one of setting the boundaries for legislative discretion. Failure by a legislature to provide
for any exemptions may well result in a
burden on religious freedom, as the Court
noted in Sherbert v. Verner.13 Too many
exemptions, on the other hand, may result
in favoritism toward certain sects and may
create a burden for the non-believer or
non-member. The discussion of the problem by Katz is somewhat weak, in that he
does little more than record the Sherbert
decision in his Epilogue to the lectures.
The book is a worthwhile contribution
to a much-discussed topic and merits consideration by all interested in the developing concept of religious neutrality. The
basic thesis, originally espoused by the
author in 1953,'14 warrants closer analysis
and deeper development in the light of recent cases than the scholarly professor has
presented in this book.15
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